Convergence of discontinuous games and essential Nash equilibria
Abstract
En
Let Y be a topological space of non-cooperative games and let F be the map defined on Y such that F(y) is the set of all Nash equilibria of a game y. We are interested in finding conditions on the games which guarantee the upper semicontinuity of the map F. This property of F is a first requirement in order to study the existence of a dense subset Z of Y such that any game y belonging to Z has the following stability property: any Nash equilibria of the game y can be approached by Nash equilibria of a net of games converging to y.
Let Y be a topological space of non-cooperative games and let F be the map defined on Y such that F(y) is the set of all Nash equilibria of a game y. We are interested in finding conditions on the games which guarantee the upper semicontinuity of the map F. This property of F is a first requirement in order to study the existence of a dense subset Z of Y such that any game y belonging to Z has the following stability property: any Nash equilibria of the game y can be approached by Nash equilibria of a net of games converging to y.
DOI Code:
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Keywords:
Discontinuous non-cooperative games; better-reply secure games; pseudocontinuous functions; essential Nash equilibria
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